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Situation assessment is the first step in the Command and
Control process. In naval tactical teams, it has become more
critical even as it has become more difficult.
Part of the Navy's attempt to address this issue is the
Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) program. Under
TADMUS, the Situation Assessment In Naval Teams (SAINT)
experiment was run at NPS in December, 1991. This thesis
describes the SAINT experiment and uses data collected during
the experiment to study the effects of team leader feedback on
situation assessment in distributed air defense teams. The
emphasis of study is on performance, (error rate and pattern)
,
subjective workload, and communication rates.
Findings include: feedback of the leader's current
assessment lowers explicit coordination; feedback does not
affect subjective workload; feedback increases error rates,
and may affect error patterns. Evidence of feedback causing
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In the past five years, the U.S. Navy has seen a profound shift in the threat it must
meet. The probability of a full-scale conventional or nuclear global war with a
monolithic, centrally controlled superpower has vanished along with the Soviet Union and
the Warsaw Pact. Unfortunately, the luxuries of a single, longtime foe, (e.g., detailed
planning, well known tactics, a developed warning system, even a certain predictability
of threat), have also vanished. Containment of communism has been replaced with
maintenance of global stability.
Today's Navy is faced with the challenge of a growing number of nations which
possess sophisticated weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction. Increasing
emphasis is placed on regional conflict scenarios. Such conflicts are typically not blue
water engagements with inherent warnings and space to maneuver. They are typically
near land. A different set of threats to the surface operator are presented in this near
land operating area (NLOA): anti-ship missiles launched from shore or from highly
maneuverable patrol craft; shallow water mines; shore-based enemy aircraft and a 360
degree threat sector. The results are less room for maneuver and far shorter reaction
times to a wider spectrum of threats.
In response, the Navy is developing a "stability strategy" which focuses on two
regional contingencies: preventing conflict where it can; and engaging in combat only
when it must [Ref. l:p. 3]. The success of both are dependent on correctly assessing the
current tactical situation. Effective command, control, communications (C3) begins with
effective situation assessment. Unfortunately, "The uncertainty of the period makes
warning signs even more ambiguous, reaction times even shorter, the identity and
motives of potential adversaries more vague and the timing and scenario of unfolding
events more difficult to discern." [Ref. l:p. 2] In short, situation assessment in naval
teams has become more critical even as it has become more difficult.
In the area of anti-air warfare (AAW), the problem is especially acute. Detect-to-
engage sequences have been reduced to minutes; in some cases even to seconds. Yet
Combat Information Center (CIC) AAW teams are still trained to fight the traditional,
blue water engagement with the bulk of the fighting taking place in an outer air battle
(OAB) 100 to 250 nautical miles from the main force. This is done under the
assumption that doctrine designed for a blue water engagement in a full scale, declared
war is also good for a near-land CALOW (Crisis and Limited Objective Warfare)
operation. This is a dangerous assumption and one that is under critical re-evaluation.
Part of this re-evaluation effort is the Navy's Tactical Decision Making Under
Stress (TADMUS) program. The purpose of TADMUS is to provide a better
understanding of individual and team behavior in distributed naval decision making
environments under high stress conditions in order to support the development of new
training procedures and non-intrusive decision aides [Ref. 2]. Under the TADMUS
initiative, ALPHATECH INC. has developed an experiment to study situation assessment
in naval teams (SAINT) [Ref. 3:p. 15].
The first SAINT experiment was run at the Naval Postgraduate School in
December, 1991. This thesis will describe the SAINT experiment and will use data
collected during the experiment to study the effects of team leader feedback on situation
assessment in distributed air defense teams.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to identify actions or behaviors that contribute to
performance under conditions of high stress. The emphasis was placed on leader
feedback to subordinate decision makers concerning his opinion of the hostility of a given
contact. This seemed the most likely area in which changes in current Navy training
structures could be effected.
1. Research Questions
The first three research questions do not relate directly to the thesis. However,
if the data from the experiment is to be used, these questions must be answered
affirmatively. If the independent "stressor" variables have no effect on subjective
workload, they can not be termed "stressors", and no statements can be made concerning
their relationships to dependent variables in the context of stress. The research questions
are as follows:
• Does stress due to time pressure increase subjective workload?
• Does stress due to uncertainty, (garbled information), increase subjective
workload?
• Does stress due to high target ambiguity increase subjective workload?
• Does leader feedback lower communication rates?
• Does leader feedback lower subjective workload?
• Does leader feedback lower a team's overall error rate?
• Does leader feedback affect the error pattern, (number of false alarms versus
misses)?
2. Predictions
Based on a survey of the literature, an attempt was made to predict answers
to the research questions. This was not possible in all instances.
With respect to time pressure, it was expected that subjective workload would
increase as time pressure increased. In an experimental study on hierarchical team
coordination, Wang and Serfaty showed that this was the expected pattern [Ref. 4:p.l5].
It was expected that increasing levels of uncertainty, (induced by garbled
information), would increase the subjective workload by forcing decision makers (DMs)
to probe more often to get the required information [Ref. 5]. The stress associated with
receiving no reward, (information), after performing the correct task, (probe), was also
expected to add to the subjective workload.
The stress associated with high target ambiguity, (difficulty in discrimination
between hostile and neutral), was also expected to increase subjective workload. Entin
and Serfaty report that as ambiguity increases, so does subjective workload. Their
results were similar under both high and low time pressure. [Ref. 6:p. 46]
Does leader feedback lower communication rates? It is known that as time
pressure increases, teams adapt to the increasing subjective workload by reducing rates
of explicit coordination [Ref. 5:p. 16]. It has also been hypothesized that the ability of
teams to coordinate implicitly is the result of shared mental models of both the task at
hand and the capabilities of team members [Ref. 7:p. 1]. Furthermore, expert
commanders "...communicate their intent and understanding of the situation frequently
in order to maintain a common mental model of the situation, an essential feature to
facilitate implicit coordination in the team." [Ref. 8:p.8] It was therefore expected that
feedback of the leader's current assessment of the contact would lower communication
rates by facilitating implicit coordination.
If, as expected, feedback lowers explicit coordination, it should also lower
subjective workload. This may not hold true in the instance of low time pressure, but
as time pressure increases and the need for implicit coordination rises with it, feedback
should be seen as a factor that helps maintain workload at an acceptable level. At the
very least, workload should be less under high time pressure with feedback than under
high time pressure without feedback. This should also hold true for the other stressors,
such as high uncertainty and high ambiguity.
With respect to the last two research questions, there appears to be little
empirical research that has studied the merits of feedback, (as narrowly defined in the
SAINT experimental paradigm), on team performance. However, studies have shown
that the assessment of a situation is captive to the most recent information received by
the decision maker, since all hypotheses under consideration do not have the same prior
probability of occurring [Ref. 9:p. 34]. This recency effect is compounded by the fact
that people have cognitive limitations that only allow them to maintain a few hypotheses
about a current situation at any given time [Ref. 9:pp. 34-35]. This is further
complicated in that people do not seek or apply information objectively in an effort to
confirm or refute the few hypotheses they do maintain. Rather, they frequently exhibit
"confirmatory biases". New information is sought and incoming information is filtered
to confirm rather than test a current assessment of the situation [Ref. 9: p. 44]. This can
have tragic results.
In the case of the USS Vincennes downing Iran Air Flight 655, the crew
appeared to exhibit a classic case of such confirmatory bias.
TIC (Tactical Information Coordinator) and IDS (Identification Supervisor) became
convinced track 4131 was an Iranian F-14 after receiving the IDS report of a
momentary Mode-II. After this report of the Mode-II, TIC appears to have
distorted data flow in an unconscious attempt to make available evidence fit a
preconceived scenario. [Ref. 10:p. 45]
Also,
In the final minute and forty seconds, the AAW (Anti-Air Warfare officer) tells his
captain, as a fact, that the aircraft has veered from the flight path into an attack
profile, and is rapidly descending at increasing speed directly towards USS
Vincennes. Even though the tone of these reports must have seemed increasingly
hysterical ... the AAW made no attempt to confirm the reports on his own. Quick
reference to the CRO (character read-out) on the console directly in front of him
would have immediately shown increasing not decreasing altitude. . . . (He) relied
on the judgement of one or two second class petty officers, buttressed by his own
preconceived perception. [Ref. ll:p. 5]
The crew expected an air attack and all incoming information was construed
as confirming an earlier call by IDS of track 4131 as "Iranian F-14". Despite repeated
indications of an ascending contact squawking constant Mode-Ill, the AAW team
persisted in its assessment of a descending contact squawking Mode-II. This biased
interpretation of the available data was the only one transmitted to the captain, who
sought and considered only this interpreted assessment. He did not seek any raw
measurements of his own. [Ref. 10:pp. 1-45]
The last two research questions may give some insights into whether feedback of
the leader's current assessment of the situation, (i.e., hostile/neutral), intensifies or
mitigates the phenomena of recency and confirmatory bias.
H. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. OVERVIEW
The SAINT experimental paradigm is a modification of the Distributed Dynamic
Decisionmaking (DDD-II) paradigm developed by Kleinman, Serfaty and Luh in 1984
and updated by Kleinman and Serfaty in 1989. For the SAINT experiment run in
December of 1991, the task was a CIC-type distributed situation assessment problem
faced by a four-person hierarchical command team [Ref. 3:p. 16]. The primary goal of
the experimental paradigm was for the team to collect, evaluate and fuse data concerning
an inbound contact in order to infer correctly its hostility or neutrality in a timely
fashion. The simulated environment was an analogue of the anti-air warfare (AAW)
team of the Combat Information Center on a cruiser. The four-person team assessing
the contact was an analogue of the tactical action officer (TAO) and three of his support
staff.
Each of the three subordinate team members performs a different task.
ALPHATECH INC.'s original paradigm for SAINT, as set forth in their technical
proposal of May, 1991, called for a team structure that provided for partial functional
overlap among the decision makers. Each subordinate decision maker was to have the
ability to probe for measurements on two of the three contact attributes, (size, altitude
rate and radar emission type), with primary responsibility in one and secondary
responsibility in the other [Ref. 3:p. 16]. This was to allow for the gathering of data
relating to how stress affects team coordination and burden sharing. However, the
eventual team structure actually used in the December, 1991, experiment did not provide
the overlap [Ref. 12]. Each subordinate had access to only one of the contact's three
attributes. No horizontal coordination was required or possible in completing subordinate
tasks. Each subordinate team member obtained noisy measurements on one of the
attributes by using a mouse to position a cursor over the target icon. When the mouse
was clicked, a window was displayed and, after ten seconds, a measurement of the
attribute was displayed. Occasionally, no information was provided. A tick mark (-)
taking its place. The frequency of this information loss was manipulated as an
independent variable and named "uncertainty". After a team member had collected
enough readings to determine an attribute's value, this value was passed verbally to the
TAO, and manually entered in the subordinate's computer log along with the subjective
confidence in the current value assigned to the attribute.
The job of the TAO was to fuse the attribute information provided by the
subordinates and make a determination as to the contact's hostility. He not only received
verbal reports from the three subordinates, but was also able, with his mouse, to open
a window, (see Figure 1), that displayed each of the three subordinates' most recent
attribute values and confidence levels as entered in their personal logs. (Note. There was
a ten second "communications delay" between the time a subordinate made an entry and
the TAO's version was updated.)
However, the TAO did not have direct access to sensors. He had to verbally task
one or more of the subordinates to provide additional attribute estimates or raw data as
required. The TAO was to make a hostility determination based on current information.
The dissemination of this opinion every 45 seconds was manipulated as an independent
variable called "feedback".
The TAO had to make a final determination of the inbound track's hostility before
it entered the protected zone of the carrier. This final determination, or the contact
entering the protected zone ended the trial and all four team members received feedback
as to the correctness of their call. This feedback was not manipulated.
B. SETUP
1. Physical
The physical setup of the experiment consisted of four physically separate
bays, each containing a single game station. The purpose in separating the stations was
to ensure that all communications would be either via voice net, or via
the software, and hence recorded. The experiment was hosted on the DDD-II simulator
using software developed at the University of Connecticut and SUN workstations
connected by a local ETHERNET. Each game station consisted of a graphics display,
a keyboard, a mouse and an intercom headset provided by NTSC Orlando.
2. Test Subjects
The test subjects included nineteen junior to field grade military officers and
one civilian. The twenty subjects were drawn from the Joint Command, Control,
Communications (JC3) curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
































Figure 1: Sample SAINT Display
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experience was considered both in selecting the teams and in assigning the TAOs. Team
cohesion was maintained throughout the experiment.
3. Special Equipment
Special equipment included a VHS recorder and the intercom headsets with
related communications equipment. The audio signal from the communications net was
patched directly into the VHS recorder. The TAO's game screen and all verbal
communications were recorded in this manner.
C. HYPOTHESES
The purpose of this thesis is to identify actions or behaviors that contribute to the
CIC AAW team performance under conditions of high stress induced by time pressure,
uncertainty and ambiguity. In narrowing the emphasis, leader feedback was selected as
an area with possible implications in effective team training. The following hypotheses
are based on the research questions and literature survey discussed in Chapter I:
1. Hypothesis I:
Leader feedback of current hostility assessment lowers explicit coordination.
2. Hypothesis H:
Leader feedback of current hostility assessment lowers subjective workload.
3. Hypothesis HI:
Leader feedback of current hostility assessment lowers error rates.
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4. Hypothesis IV:
Leader feedback of current hostility assessment changes the error pattern.
D. ASSUMPTIONS
1. General
The major assumption made during this experiment was that the learning curve was
completed during the two training sessions, and that the data is therefore free from any
effects due to the learning curve. Another assumption was that the subjects were willing
and enthusiastic, and that the data is therefore not tainted by halfhearted guessing on the
part of the TAO or his staff. This assumption is necessary because subjects were not
volunteers.
2. Simplifying Assumptions
In addition to the general assumptions outlined above, there were several
simplifying assumptions that divorce the experimental paradigm from reality but are
necessary to gain some control over the manipulation of the selected independent
variables. These include:
• Strictly an AAW problem;
• No multi-target tracking;
• Semi-artificial roles for subordinates;
• Single intra-team communications net;
• No inter-team (i.e., between platforms) communications;
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• Simulates only a small portion of total CIC personnel, activities, noise and
confusion.
E. STATISTICAL DESIGN
The experiment was designed to yield balanced data for ANOVA purposes. Four
independent variables were part of this design. The first three resulted in 12 different
possible combinations (3 time stress * 2 uncertainty * 2 feedback). Each combination
was presented twice, for a total of 24 presentations per team. The four levels of
ambiguity were manipulated evenly over each group of 12 presentations. The 24
presentations were run on five separate teams, yielding 120 data points for performance
measures. The four independent variables are outlined below:
1. Time Induced Stress
Stress due to increasing time compression was manipulated at three levels:
• Low = 6 minute prosecution window;
• Medium = 4 minute prosecution window;
• High = 2 minute prosecution window.
2. Uncertainty
As discussed earlier, this was a measure of how often a probe resulted in no
data:
• Low = 10% garbled data (ticks);
• High = 50% garbled data (ticks).
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3. Feedback of Hostility Assessment
Under "feedback" conditions, the TAO was required to verbally disseminate
his current opinion as to the inbound track's hostility or neutrality every 45 seconds.
Under "no feedback" conditions, he was prohibited from ever disseminating his opinion
of hostility or neutrality. All instances of improper dissemination were recorded by the
observer.
4. Ambiguity
Ambiguity was manipulated as the fourth independent variable. This was a
measure of how clearly hostile or clearly neutral the target profile was, (see Figure 2).
One half the profiles were ambiguous based on the general definition of "hostile" given
to participants. This is further broken down as follows: one fourth clearly neutral; one
fourth ambiguous neutral; one fourth ambiguous hostile; and one fourth clearly hostile.
F. MEASURES
1. General
The experiment included both qualitative and quantitative measures.
Qualitative measures included: pre-experiment questionnaires to measure team
preparation and coordination; pre-presentation predictions of hostility recorded for all
subjects; subjective workload assessments after each presentation; subjective performance
evaluation questionnaires after each block of six presentations; and a post experiment
questionnaire.
15
Figure 2: Target Trajectories
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Quantitative measures were recorded automatically by the DDD-II simulator.
These electronically recorded measures number over forty and range from the TAO's
final decision to the number of times each subordinate probed the contact for attribute
information. The SWAT data was also recorded by the simulator, (see next section),
both for the four individual decision makers and the team. Quantitative measures of
verbal communication rates and types were recorded manually by observers with tally
sheets.
2. Workload Assessment
In order to assess workload for the purpose of testing the viability of the
stressors, each participant completed the Subjective Workload Assessment Technique or
SWAT [Ref. 13:pp. 403-406]. SWAT consists of two phases. Phase one should be
carried out prior to the data collection part of the experiment. Each participant performs
a card sort to develop a unique workload scale. Each card contains a different
combination of the three workload dimensions: timeload; mental effort load; and
psychological stress load [Ref. 13]. Each dimension has three levels: low; moderate;
and high. Crossing dimensions with levels yields 27 possible combinations which are
rank ordered by the participant according to the workload described. It should be noted
here that this phase was completed after data collection for SAINT, December, 1991.
The second phase occurred during data collection. At the end of each
presentation, subjects rated the workload they had just experienced based on the same
dimensions and levels described above, (eg. 321 would represent high time load,
moderate mental effort, and low psychological stress). Software, developed by G. M.
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Reid, ALPHATECH INC, then converts these numbers to a percent workload score
based on the unique workload scale developed for that participant in phase one. Zero
percent represents very low workload; 100 percent represents very high workload,
(unique to the individual).
At the writing of this thesis, converted SWAT data was not available. Means
from phase 1 had to be utilized. These means are typically highly correlated with the
converted SWAT percentages. [Ref. 14]
3. Subjective Hostility Assessment
In order to determine the subjective definition of hostility for each TAO, so
that team performance measures could be adjusted accordingly, TAOs sorted a set of
hostility cards similar to the SWAT card sort. There were 27 cards reflecting the three
target attributes, (size, altitude rate, and radar emission), and the three levels within each
attribute, (small, medium, large; climbing, level, descending; no emission, search radar,
fire control radar). In this manner, each TAO's 24 final decisions can be compared to
his own definition of hostility, as well as the "ground truth" definition of the paradigm.
The design of the December, 1991 SAINT experiment is sound. The
assumptions made were reasonable, and the statistical design should provide balanced




As well as being both quantitative and qualitative, the data was collected both
manually and electronically. Manually collected data included questionnaires, card sorts,
and observation form "tally sheets", as well as the audio/video tape of each presentation.
Electronically collected data included the quantitative measures collected by the
computer.
B. PROBLEMS
1. Electronically Collected Data
There were no problems with the electronically collected data. Complete data
for all 24 presentations on all five teams were collected. In addition, complete SWAT
survey data was collected for all 120 runs.
2. Manually Collected Data
There were some actual as well as some potential problems in the manual
collection of data. The video/audio tape was not started at the beginning of all runs.
This affected three of 120 runs. However, partial runs were recorded in all three cases.
Potential problems lay in the fact that the observation forms for
communications analysis can be interpreted differently by each observer, (see Appendices
A and B). The categories are too broad, and much data may have been lost or skewed
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because an observer could not force a comment to fit one of them, either letting it go or
placing it where it "best fit". Some effort was made to prevent the inherent variance
from one observer to another. In the instance of TAO communications, the same
observer, (the author), recorded all 24 presentations for all five teams. This was not
possible, from a practical standpoint, in the case of subordinate communications. A total
of seven different observers, rotating between teams, recorded subordinate
communications. Additionally, some categories are simply not needed based on the
experimental paradigm. For example, information transfers of raw data would never be
made by the TAO, except to call the original target of interest. Indeed, this should be
a category of its own. Careful modifications to the data collection forms could reduce
the confusion for observers as well as reduce the amount of potentially lost or skewed
data.
C. DATA CODING SCHEME
1. Manually Collected Data
a. Observation Forms
Appendix C contains the coding scheme for data collected manually with
observation forms. Two types of observation forms were used: one for the TAO,
(Appendix A), and one for subordinates, (Appendix B). These forms illustrate the areas
of interest in data collection. The data collection method simply required the observers
to keep a tally of all instances of communication made by the test participants. The
forms contain separate blocks for each of the varied types of communications of interest
20
to the experimenters. For situations not specifically addressed by the form, a comments
section is provided. The problems with this type of data collection were discussed
above.
b. Questionnaires
Appendix D contains the data coding scheme for data collected manually
using questionnaires. An example of a questionnaire is seen in Appendix E. This
particular questionnaire was given to participants after each block of six presentations to
solicit opinions and assessments concerning mission accomplishment, team and individual
performance and goal achievement.
2. Electronically Collected Data
Appendix F contains the coding scheme used for electronically collected data.
Appendix G is an example of this raw data as extracted from the computer after the
experiment.
Although both realized and potential problems occurred in data collection, a
set of balanced data was produced for purposes of analysis of variance. A description




After all 120 trials had been run, data was processed by ALPHATECH INC. The
dependent variables were first organized into three sets, each with various categories.
Set #B1 includes semi-processed data collected on-line by the DDD-II simulator, and was
broken into performance, strategy, and workload categories. Set #B2 includes semi-
processed data collected by observers. It contains communications data on the TAO and
subordinate decision makers. Set #B3 includes semi-processed data collected from
subjects and contains data from the questionnaires.
The next step by ALPHATECH INC was to formulate a set of aggregated measures
with categorization, based on variable sets B1-B3. This set is categorized #A1. The
coding scheme for aggregated measures set Al is contained in Appendix H. The data
was then evaluated by subpopulation based on this coding scheme. Means tables were
generated for each subpopulation, (dependent variable by independent variable, eg. API
by feedback, API by uncertainty, etc.). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed
for all dependent variables.
ANOVA generates a "p" value. This value is the probability of making an error
in claiming that a given dependent variable is affected differently by different levels of
an independent variable. The standard acceptable value is p< =0.05. Another way to
22
view a value of p< 0.05 would be to say, "I can be 95% certain that the change in
dependent variable X was caused by independent variable Y and not by chance.
"
B. RESULTS
This thesis will only provide results from the data analysis that are pertinent to the
research questions stated in Chapter I.
1. Workload Assessment
It was expected that uncertainty, time-stress and ambiguity would all increase
subjective workload. This is the case, (see Figures 3-5), however, only uncertainty had
a statistically significant effect, (p < 0.045). The mean workload for the entire population
was only 1.3459, (1 =low, 2 = moderate, 3=high). Under the most stressful conditions,
(high uncertainty, high workload, high ambiguity), workload was reported as 1.7709.
This is barely "moderate". Clearly, more stressors need to be introduced to the
experimental paradigm.
2. Effects of Feedback
a. On Communication Rates
It was expected that TAO feedback of his opinion as to the
hostility/neutrality of the inbound contact of interest would lower communication rates
by facilitating implicit coordination through an expanded shared mental model.
23
Figure 3: Workload Versus Uncertainty
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This does not, at first glance, appear to be the case. Feedback actually increased
overall message rate, (messages per minute), from 7.6667 without feedback, to 8.4667
with feedback, (p< 0.046). However, this is deceptive. By forcing the leader













Figure 4: Workload Versus Time-Pressure
to communicate every 45 seconds in the feedback condition, we artificially raise his
communication rate to subordinates from 1.4833 to 2.5167, (see Figure 6, p< 0.002).
If we look at subordinate communications to the TAO, a factor not artificially altered by
manipulating the independent variable, we see the mean percentage of communications
25
Figure 5: Workload Versus Ambiguity
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Figure 6: TAO To Subordinate Communications
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fall from 77.533 percent to 62.3333 percent under feedback, (see Figure 7, p< 0.005).
Horizontal communications were not affected by feedback, (p< 0.777), but this is
expected in that the experimental paradigm does not require nor encourage
communication between subordinates. Feedback does not change this fact. On the
whole, feedback would seem to lower explicit coordination.
If we look at the mean number of information requests made by the
TAO, we see that they drop from a mean of 2.5167 per presentation with no feedback,
to 2.0000 per presentation, with feedback, (p< 0.044). Another interesting measure is
the "anticipation ratio". This is the difference between information transfers to TAO and
information requests from TAO, that difference then divided by the information transfers
to TAO, expressed as a percent. This anticipation ratio increases from 85.75%, with no
feedback, to 87.4333% with feedback, (however, p< 0.325). Taken together, the drop
in information requests and the rise in the anticipation ratio seem to indicate that
feedback does play a role in implicit coordination.
b. On Subjective Workload
It was expected that feedback would lower subjective workload. This
was not the case. Workload under no feedback conditions was 1.3425 and actually
increased very slightly under feedback to 1.3493. These numbers are obviously nearly
the same (standard deviation 0.4), and the p value is not significant.
28













Figure 7: Subordinate To TAO Communications
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Feedback also had no effect under the high time pressure condition, which was predicted
to be most likely to show effects under feedback.
c. On Error Rate
No predictions were made concerning the effects of feedback on error
rate. The mean error rate, (according to ground truth in the paradigm), increased from
15.0 percent with no feedback, to 28.33 percent with feedback, (p< 0.078). When we
adjust the data for TAOs' subjective hostility definition, the error rate jumps to 26.67
percent, and is not affected by feedback, (p<1.0). Feedback of TAO opinion as to
contact hostility has a negative impact on team performance. This is seen graphically in
Figure 8.
d. On Error Pattern
No predictions were made concerning the effects of feedback on the
error pattern, (false alarm rate versus miss rate). As seen earlier, the overall error rate
nearly doubles under feedback. Did the error pattern change as well? It would appear
not, (see Figure 9). As expected, the false alarm rate and the miss rate are both affected
by feedback, (p< 0.099). Under both conditions, the false alarm rate is larger than the




























Figure 9: Error Pattern
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under the no feedback condition, the miss rate is only 80 percent as large as the false
alarm rate. Under the feedback condition, the miss rate rose to 88 percent as large as
the false alarm rate. Feedback may have an effect on the error pattern that is too subtle
to see readily with the relatively small population of 120 final decisions. Added evidence
to this effect may be seen when we look at the TAO initial judgment. Under the no
feedback condition, this was 1.4167 (1 = neutral, 2 = hostile). Under feedback, this
number drops to 1.3167, (p< 0.109). Figure 10 shows this in raw percentages. From
this figure, it is clear that under no-feedback conditions, TAOs initially report neutrals
and hostiles at about the same rate. When TAOs provide feedback, they report neutrals
at a 2:1 ratio over hostiles. When compared to the error patterns, we see that as the
initial judgement gets closer to neutral, the miss rate increases as a proportion of the
false alarm rate. In other words, as feedback drives the initial judgment towards neutral,
(from 1.4 to 1.3), TAOs are more likely to call a hostile contact neutral, at final














"igure 10: TAO Initial Judgments
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e. The Question of Confirmatory Bias
As discussed in Chapter I, feedback may have some influence on
confirmatory bias. There is some evidence of this in the two preceding sections. It was
stated earlier that feedback increases the error rate. It also lowers the probe rate of the
contact by subordinates from .1815 probes per second to .1722 probes per second,
(p< 0.037). Furthermore, feedback increases slack time, (time remaining at final
decision), from 23.25 seconds with no feedback, to 28.7333 seconds with feedback,
(however, p< 0.312). Confidence on final judgement, (l:low, 2:moderate, 3:high), also
increased from 1.6167 with no feedback to 1.6333 with feedback, (p< 0.034). When
combined, these factors seem to indicate a trend, under feedback, of a willingness to
make the wrong decisions more quickly with less information yet with increased
confidence. This seems to indicate that feedback of the leader's current situation
assessment as to the inbound contact's hostility contributes to confirmatory bias, which
in turn reduces overall performance. Further evidence is seen in the fact that
confirmatory bias, if it is caused by feedback, would predict the slight change in error




The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions about the four hypotheses of the
thesis. They will be made based on the data analysis discussed above. With regard to
the first hypothesis, it is concluded that feedback does lower explicit coordination. There
is also some evidence, though not statistically significant (p<.325), that feedback
increases anticipation. It is not clear whether or not the cause of this is an enhanced
shared mental model. Further study should be done in this area.
With regard to the second hypothesis, there is little evidence that feedback, in the
narrow definition of the experimental paradigm, lowers subjective workload. This should
be looked at when the converted SWAT percentages are available, and should be studied
again under conditions of truly high stress.
With regard to the third hypothesis, it can not be concluded that leader feedback
lowers error rates. Indeed, there is strong evidence to suggest that it increases error
rates. The adjustment of the data for subjective hostility definition was inconclusive; all
p values jumped to 1.0. This indicates a problem in the method of obtaining this
subjective definition that should be addressed prior to the next experiment. It is touched
on briefly in the next section.
With regard to the fourth hypothesis, there is some evidence that feedback may
have affected the error pattern. However, the evidence is not strong, and further
research should be done in this area.
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In addition to the four hypothesis, there is evidence that feedback contributes to
confirmatory bias, and as a result, lowers performance. On balance there seems to be
little to recommend feedback of this nature in situation assessment.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. FOR FUTURE SAINT EXPERIMENTS
1. Stressors
While the SWAT data indicate that the stressors utilized by the experimental
paradigm had the expected effects on subjective workload, it is clear that situation
assessment under truly high levels of stress was not observed. The mean subjective
workload was only 1.3459, (3=high stress). Under the most stressful conditions, (high
time pressure, high uncertainty, high ambiguity), the mean subjective workload was only
1.7709. More realism, and as a result more stress, must be introduced.
The first way to do this would be to add a secondary and even a tertiary task.
Keeping an externally located superior informed, (manipulated by superior queries/does
not query), is one possibility. Another is making appropriate warnings to the unknown
inbound aircraft, (manipulated by a screen prompt). Another way to increase stress
would be to increase contact attributes. For example, have another decision maker
determine if it is in a designated commercial airway, and have another probe for Identity
Friend or Foe (IFF) readings. Adding attributes would not only increase the TAO
decision matrix, but it would also increase the stress on the communications circuit by
adding more users. A final way to increase the stress on all four players would be to




As discussed in the section devoted to data, the observation forms should be
revised to better reflect the experimental paradigm, and the categories should be more
specific. Additionally, all four observers should have headsets so they can hear requests
as well as responses. Much data may have been lost because the observers could only
hear one side of communications. For example, "Roger." may be classified as no
information transfer, a transfer of raw data or a transfer of an opinion on hostility
depending on the question or statement which prompted the response.
3. Subjective Hostility
The hostility card sort should be done before data collection, after 12
presentations, and after the last presentation. This is recommended because there is
evidence that subjective definitions of hostility changed throughout the experiment. This
would have been predicted by Kathryn Blackmond Laskey, who states in a study on
assessing preferences in the presence of random response error:
There are four general approaches.... The first is simply to ignore the problem,
treating the decision maker's responses as if they were error free. The second is
to average multiple judgments concerning the value or utility of each outcome. If
the response errors are interdependent of one another, this averaging strategy will
produce more reliable preference assessments. The third approach... is to employ
consistency checks by including logically interdependent judgments in the
preference assessment task. If inconsistencies arise, the decision maker is asked
to resolve them. In the process, decision analysts argue, the decision maker will
gain insight into his own preferences, and discover his true preferences. The
fourth approach to the problem of response error is to fit preference models to the
decision maker's responses. [Ref. 15:p. 996]
For the December experiment, it seems Laskey' s first approach was used. The
card sort should be done in the second recommended manner in order to capture any
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trends, so that the performance data can be adjusted accordingly. When the sort is done
only once, as in the December, 1991 experiment, the adjusted error rates increase instead
of decrease, and all associated p values jump to 1.0. This is because we are applying
a single subjective definition of hostility to all 24 presentations, when that definition
probably changed more than once.
4. For Further Study
As discussed earlier, under the no feedback condition, TAOs initially reported
neutrals and hostiles at the same rate. However, under feedback conditions, they
reported neutrals at a 2:1 ratio over hostiles. Are TAOs anticipating a subordinate bias
towards hostile and unconsciously trying to adjust for this "framing"? Further study is
needed to answer this question.
B. For Naval Team Training
The results of this first SAINT experiment would seem to indicate that Navy team
trainers should discourage the feedback of the CO/TAO opinion of an inbound contact's
hostility or neutrality while the situation is still being assessed. While feedback may help
in facilitating implicit coordination by extending the shared mental model, feedback of
this specific nature extends the model too far. The goal of the CIC AAW team is to
assess an often confusing, uncertain situation. By giving feedback on his current
assessment, the leader compounds the negative phenomenon of confirmatory bias, and
the error rate increases. Sharing what are essentially predictions of the final decision,
biases the team and reduces performance.
40
There is no room for bias in today's uncertain world where correct and timely
situation assessment can mean the prevention of the loss of innocent life, and the
avoidance inaction leading to tragedy and disgrace. Indeed, it can mean the difference
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Additional Notes on this Trial:
APPENDIX B
"SAINT" EXPERIMENT: NPS Nov -Dec 91
OBSERVATION FORM FOR SUBORDINATES
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SAINT EXPERIMENT TTADMUS .13299)
Dependent Variables




CI. Total number of information transfers from leader to subordinates (L/S)
C2. Number of L/S opinion (hostile/neutral judgment & confidence) transfers
C3. Number of L/S processed info, (specialized judgment & confidence) transfers
C4. Number of L/S raw data transfers
C5. Total number of information requests from leader to subordinates (L/S)
C6. Number of L/S opinion (hostile/neutral judgment & confidence) requests
C7. Number of L/S processed info, (specialized judgment & confidence) requests
C8. Number of L/S raw data requests
OTHER COMMUNICATION
C9. Total number of feedback errors
CIO. Number of times leader gave feedback when shouldn't have
CI 1. Number of times leader didn't give feedback when should have
CI 2. Number of bolstering comments to subordinates
CI 3. Number of action requests (other than above) by leader to subordinates
TIMELINESS*
C14. Latency of leader's first judgment [sees]





CI 5. Total number of information transfers among subordinates (S/S)
CI 6. Number of S/S opinion (hostile/neutral judgment & confidence) transfers
C17. Number of S/S processed info, (specialized judgment & confidence) transfers
CI 8. Number of S/S raw data transfers
C19. Total number of information requests among subordinates (S/S)
C20. Number of S/S opinion (hostile/neutral judgment & confidence) requests
C21. Number of S/S processed info, (specialized judgment & confidence) requests
C22. Number of S/S raw data requests
C23. Total number of information transfers from subordinates to leader (S/L)
C24. Number of S/L opinion (hostile/neutral judgment & confidence) transfers
C25. Number of S/L processed info, (specialized judgment & confidence) transfers
C26. Number of S/L raw data transfers
C27. Total number of information requests from subordinates to leader (S/L)
C28. Number of S/L opinion (hostile/neutral judgment & confidence) requests
C29. Number of S/L processed info, (specialized judgment & confidence) requests
C30. Number of S/L raw data requests
OTHER COMMUNICATION
C3 1 . Number of bolstering comments among subordinates
C32. Number of action requests (other than above) among subordinates
2-2
APPENDIX D
SAINT EXPERIMENT fTADMl IS 13299)
Dependent Variables
Set # B3: semi-processed data collected off-line from subjects
L SUB TECTPVE RATINGS I : After each experimental block
Rl. Subjective rating (1-5) of team's coordination activities (4 blocks over time).
R2. Subjective rating (1-5) of team's radio-net discipline (4 blocks over time).
R3. Subjective estimate (1-5) of the amount of information obtained from other
team members to perform job (4 blocks over time).
R4. Subjective estimate (1-5) of the number of measurements (probes) taken per
trial (4 blocks over time).
R5. Subjective estimate (1-5) of the number of times communications occurred
with other team members (4 blocks over time).
R6.Subjective estimate (1-5) of the amount of time spent communicating with other
team members (4 blocks over time).




"SAINT* EXPERIMENT: NPS Nov - Dec 91
POST SESSION QUESTIONNAIRE
Team*: 1 2 3 Trial* Date/Time
4 5 6
Please place an X any where on the line that best reflects your response.
1. On average, how difficult were the scenario trials you just completed?
I I I I I I
Not Difficult Midpoint Very
At All Difficult
2. How well did you perform your specific task?
I I I I I I
Not Well Midpoint Very
At All Well
3. How would you rate your team's coordination activities while performing target identification?
I I I I I I
Not Well Midpoint Very
At All Well
4. How well did you exercise radio-net discipline?
I I I I I I
Not Well Midpoint Very
At All Well
5. How well did the team exercise radio-net discipline?
I I I I I I
Not Well Midpoint Very
AtM Well
6. In addition to sensor measurements, how much information did you get from other team
members to perform your job?
I I I I I I
Very Midpoint A Great
little Deal
7. On average, how many measurements did you take per trial (for the scenario trials just
completed)?
I I I I I I
2 4 6 8 lOor
more
8. O average, how many times did you communicate with another team member (for the scenario
trials just completed)?
I I I I I I
3 6 9 12 15 or
more
9. On average, how much time did you spend communicating with other team members (for the
scenario trials just completed)?
I I I I I I
Very Midpoint A Great
Little Deal
SAINT EXPERIMENT (TADM! IS 13299)
Dependent Variables
Set # Bl : semi-processed data collected on-line by DDD simulator
J, PERFORMANCE:
ACCURACY
PI. Final decision by Leader (TAO)(l: neutral, 2: hostile)
P2. Final error (1: correct, 0: incorrect, -1: no decision)
P3. Final confidence (1: low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
TIMELINESS




51. Number ofjudgment entries by leader (without final decision)
52. Number of database queries by leader (to see subordinate's latest judgment)
DECISIONMAKING
53. Number ofjudgment changes by leader over time (e.g. 1121 —> 2 changes)
54. Initial leader's judgment (1: neutral, 2: hostile)
55. Initial leader's confidence (1: low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
IL3: Subordinates (IDS, TIC, EWS)
INFORMATION SEEKING
56. Total number of probes by subordinates (information seeking activity)
57. Information seeking rate: S6 / (Tinitial - Tfinal) [probes/min]
58. Number of probes by DM1 (IDS)
1-1
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S9. Number of probes by DM2 (TIC)




Number of database entries by DM1
5 12. Number of database entries by DM2
5 1 3. Number of database entries by DM3
514. Total number of database entries by subordinates
INFORMATION PROCESSING
515. Initial judgment by DM1 (1: small, 2: mid-size, 3: large)
51 6. Initial judgment by DM2 (1: climbing, 2: leveling-off, 3: descending)
517. Initial judgment by DM3 (1: no emission, 2: search , 3: fire control)
518. Initial confidence of DM1 (1; low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
519. Initial confidence ofDM2 (1; low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
520. Initial confidence of DM3 (1; low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
521. Final judgment by DM1 (1: small, 2: mid-size, 3: large)
522. Final judgment by DM2 (1: climbing, 2: leveling-off, 3: descending)
523. Final judgment by DM3 (1: no emission, 2: search , 3: fire control)
524. Final confidence of DM1 (1; low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
525. Final confidence of DM2 (1; low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
526. Final confidence of DM3 (1; low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
m. WORKLOAD :
INDIVIDUAL RAW SWAT SCORES (T: Time pressure, E: Mental Effort, S: Stress)
Wl. DMl's T score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
W2. DMl's E score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
W3. DMl's S score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
W4. DM2's T score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
W5. DM2's E score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
W6. DM2's S score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
W7. DM3's T score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
W8. DM3'sE score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
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W9. DM3's S score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
W10. Leader's T score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
Wll. Leader's E score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
W12. Leader's S score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
TEAM CONSENSUS RAW SWAT SCORES
W13. Team's T score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
W14. Team's E score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
W15. Team's S score (1: low, 2: medium, 3: high)
1-3
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SAINT EXPERIMENT (TADMUS J3299) NPS NOV-DEC 1991
EXPERIMENT DATA SET #1
BJECTS
Team ID [1,2, 3,4,5]
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Structure [1: no feedback; 2: TAO's feedback]
Uncertainty [1: low (10% jamming); 2: high (50% jamming)]
Time pressure [1: low (6 min
. ) ; 2: moderate (4 min.); 3: high (2 min.)]
ENARIO ATTRIBUTES
Target hostility [1: neutral; 2: hostile]


















11 1 1 1 2
s V
9 4 1 65 10 .51 21 16 28 8 15 27 50 2 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 3 1
1 1 1 2 4 2 1 2 6 9 1 1 1 67 10 .75 23 16 28 7 13 27 47 3 1 1 3 2 1 3 1 2 3 1 2
i 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 133 2 1 2 22 10 .39 6 6 10 5 4 10 19 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 3 33 7 2 1 43 11 .37 15 10 18 4 8 16 28 3 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 3
1 1 3 1 4 1 1 1 15 2 1 2 1 22 10 56 8 5 9 1 5 7 13 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 3
1 1 3 2 6 2 1 2 22 2 1 1 1 1 18 9 .15 6 4 8 2 4 6 12 1 1 3 3 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 3
1 2 1 1 2 ' 1 1 2 20 6 1 1 66 11 00 23 16 27 8 9 25 42 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
I 2 1 2 3 2 1 3 96 4 1 2 1 52 10 99 16 13 23 4 7 22 33 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 3
1 2 2 1 6 1 1 2 17 7 2 1 1 44 10 86 13 12 19 4 4 19 27 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 2 5 1 2 15 2 2 1 2 2 45 11 02 14 11 20 5 6 19 30 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 3
1 2 3 1 1 1 1 3 13 3 1 1 25 11 81 8 6 11 4 2 9 15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 9 2 1 2 1 25 11 45 9 6 10 1 1 9 11 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 3
2 1 1 1 5 2 2 61 8 1 1 1 54 10 16 16 15 23 7 14 23 44 3 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2
2 1 1 2 4 2 1 3 23 9 1 1 1 61 10 25 21 15 25 9 14 25 48 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 3
2 1 2 1 3 1 1 3 209 1 1 3 7 8 24 2 2 3 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 3
2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 106 5 2 2 1 20 7 79 6 6 8 4 5 9 18 2 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 2
2 1 3 1 4 1 1 1 9 3 1 2 1 21 9 62 6 6 9 3 4 8 15 3 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 3
2 1 3 2 6 2 1 2 20 3 1 1 1 20 10 00 7 5 8 1 3 7 11 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 3
2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 47 7 1 1 59 10 63 18 15 26 5 8 25 38 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 3 3 1 3
2 2 1 2 3 2 1 3 16 9 1 1 1 61 10 05 17 15 29 5 10 26 41 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 3
2 2 2 1 6 1 1 3 43 6 1 1 32 8 85 8 9 15 5 5 14 24 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 5 1 2 12 4 1 1 2 1 45 10 89 15 11 19 7 6 18 31 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 3
2 2 3 1 1 1 1 3 26 2 2 1 1 16 8 42 4 5 7 3 1 5 9 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
2 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 14 3 1 1 1 21 10 00 7 5 9 1 2 8 11 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 33 4 1 2 52 8 .99 17 10 25 1 5 2 8 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 36 9 3 1 1 1 39 6 .80 13 11 15 2 5 3 10 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 1 1 2 1 5 2 1 22 4 1 2 1 35 8 .82 11 8 16 1 3 1 5 2 3 3 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 3 3
2 1 1 2 2 4 1 1 33 5 1 2 1 27 7 .14 8 7 12 1 3 1 5 3 3 3 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 3
2 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 22 4 2 1 1 18 9 .15 5 5 8 2 1 2 5 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2
2 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 3 24 2 1 2 1 20 10 .34 6 5 9 2 1 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3
2 1 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 26 4 1 1 52 8,.81 17 12 23 1 3 2 6 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 3
2 1 2 1 2 6 2 1 1 40 5 2 1 50 8,.82 15 12 23 2 4 1 7 1 3 3 2 1 1 1 3 3 1 3 3
2 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 26 6 1 1 39 10,.00 11 10 18 1 3 1 5 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 31 3 1 2 1 35 9,.17 11 9 15 1 3 1 5 3 2 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 1 2 3 1 6 1 1 2 22 1 3 1 2 18 9,.15 5 5 8 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 1 2 3 2 5 2 1 1 12 2 2 2 1 21 9.,84 6 6 9 2 2 3 1 3 3
2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 44 6 2 1 1 45 8,,04 13 11 21 2 6 2 10 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 2 1 1 2 3 2 1 3 29 9 1 2 2 51 8,,72 15 13 23 3 8 3 14 3 3 3 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 1 2 1 5 2 1 24 5 1 1 1 1 34 8.,64 10 7 17 2 3 2 7 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 3
2 2 1 2 2 4 1 2 31 7 1 1 1 33 8.,65 9 9 15 2 3 3 8 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 15 3 1 1 1 19 9.,12 4 6 9 2 2 1 5 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
2 2 1 3 2 2 2 1 2 28 3 1 2 1 17 9. 11 6 4 7 2 2 4 3 3 1 2 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 1 1 4 2 1 26 6 4 2 1 50 8. 47 15 12 23 1 2 2 5 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 3
2 2 2 1 2 6 1 2 26 5 3 1 1 55 9. 32 17 14 24 3 3 3 9 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 3 2 1 3 2
2 2 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 14 5 3 1 1 37 9. 02 10 9 18 2 2 1 5 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 30 5 1 2 1 36 9. 39 10 9 17 1 3 2 6 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 3 2
2 2 2 3 1 6 1 1 1 27 3 2 1 1 17 9. 03 5 5 7 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 2 2 3 2 5 2 1 1 10 2 1 2 1 19 8. 77 6 5 8 1 1 3 1 3 3
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 14 16 1 2 1 49 8 .03 10 25 14 11 18 9 38 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 12 9 1 1 1 54 8 .80 11 25 18 9 21 8 38 3 3 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 1 1 2 1 5 2 2 17 8 2 2 1 37 9 .14 7 17 13 6 11 7 24 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 3 3 2
3 1 1 2 2 6 2 1 1 8 7 1 1 1 44 10 .48 9 19 16 8 17 4 29 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 1
3 1 1 3 1 3 -1 4 21 9 .00 4 10 7 3 7 3 13 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
3 i 1 3 2 2 2 1 2 8 4 2 2 1 18 8 .18 4 9 5 3 5 4 12 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 3
3 1 2 1 1 4 2 2 14 14 1 2 1 54 8 .85 12 27 15 7 16 12 35 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 3
3 1 2 1 2 5 2 1 2 16 8 1 2 1 63 10 .38 15 26 22 14 25 7 46 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 3 3
3 1 2 2 1 2 -1 5 2 2 1 39 9 .00 9 15 15 7 11 6 24 3 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 1 3 3 1
3 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 14 7 1 2 1 35 8 .54 7 18 10 6 14 5 25 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 1 2 3 1 6 2 1 10 4 1 2 1 22 10,.15 4 10 8 4 6 5 15 2 1 1 1 I 1 2 1 2 2 1 2
3 1 2 3 2 4 2 1 1 5 1 3 2 1 19 8,.44 5 8 6 4 4 4 12 3 3 2 2 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 1
3 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 7 8 2 2 1 62 9,.97 13 26 23 13 25 10 48 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 2
3 2 1 1 2 3 2 1 3 38 12 1 5 1 3 36 6,,32 10 13 13 10 12 12 34 2 3 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 2 1 2 1 5 2 2 19 6 1 2 1 41 10,,21 9 IS 14 8 15 6 29 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 1
3 2 1 2 2 6 1 2 15 9 2 1 2 1 28 6,,86 7 11 10 6 7 9 22 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 3 2 1 3 2
3 2 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 4 5 2 1 1 16 7,,06 5 6 5 6 4 5 15 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
3 2 1 3 2 2 2 1 2 10 3 1 2 2 23 10. 62 5 9 9 4 7 5 16 2 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 3 2 3 3
3 2 2 1 1 4 1 1 1 15 13 2 1 1 66 10.,85 12 28 26 10 16 12 38 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 3 2 1 3
3 2 2 1 2 5 2 1 2 11 15 1 2 1 52 8.,46 14 24 14 13 15 12 40 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 3
3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 11 7 2 2 1 38 9. 16 8 18 12 5 10 6 21 2 3 1 1 1 2 3 1 3 3 1 3
3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 17 7 1 2 1 42 10. 37 10 18 14 6 15 8 29 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 2 2 3 1 6 2 2 8 4 3 1 1 1 16 7. 27 5 6 5 4 2 4 10 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 3
3 2 2 3 2 4 -1 2 2 1 22 9. 43 5 9 8 3 6 3 12 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 2
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3 1 1 1 1 6 1 1 1 22 1 5 1 1 68 11 .40 19 30 19 8 3 16 27 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 3
3 1 1 1 2 4 2 1 1 28 1 4 2 1 54 9 20 12 27 15 9 5 11 25 3 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 1
a l 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 36 1 2 1 1 40 10 71 12 16 12 7 2 9 18 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 29 1 1 2 1 34 8 83 7 16 11 3 3 8 14 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 3 3
j i 1 3 1 5 1 1 1 23 1 1 1 16 8 21 4 7 5 2 2 3 7 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
3 1 1 3 2 6 2 1 1 26 1 3 2 1 18 9 47 5 8 5 3 3 4 10 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 2 3 2
3 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 55 1 6 1 1 57 10 52 17 24 16 8 2 7 17 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 3
3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 51 1 4 2 1 53 9 67 11 25 17 3 3 6 12 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 3
3 1 2 2 1 4 1 1 1 32 1 1 1 1 38 10 00 9 18 11 5 2 5 12 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
3 1 2 2 2 5 2 1 1 16 1 3 2 1 48 11 80 14 21 13 8 2 4 14 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 3
1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 17 1 1 1 19 9 27 5 9 5 3 3 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 2 3 2 3 2 1 1 19 1 2 1 22 10 91 6 9 7 3 2 2 7 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 2 1 1 1 6 2 1 42 3 4 1 1 1 57 10 12 14 27 16 12 4 13 29 2 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 2
1 2 1 1 2 4 1 1 139 2 2 1 1 44 10 95 13 19 12 6 3 9 18 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 3 1 2
; 2 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 42 4 1 1 27 7 43 6 12 9 5 3 7 15 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
3 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 46 1 5 2 1 32 8 97 7 15 10 7 4 9 20 2 2 3 1 1 1 3 3 2 3 3 2
3 2 1 3 1 5 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 19 8 32 5 8 6 5 2 5 12 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 2 1 3 2 6 2 1 1 15 2 1 1 1 20 9 60 5 9 6 2 2 3 7 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 2 1 3 2
3 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 49 5 3 1 1 58 10 51 13 28 17 3 2 6 11 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
! 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 97 1 7 2 2 50 10 60 12 23 15 6 3 7 16 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
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SAINT EXPERIMENT (TAPMIIS U299)
Dependent Variables
Set # Al : Aggregated measures with categorization
(based on variable sets Bl, B2, and B3)
I. PERFORMANCE;
ACCURACY
API. TAO's final judgment (1: neutral, 2: hostile)
AP2. Confidence on final judgment (1: low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
AP3. Final composite target hostility judgment TO-100%]
AP4. Error rate (according to ground truth)
"
AP5. False alarm rate (false positive)
AP6. Miss rate (false negative)
TIMELINESS
AP7. Latency of first hostile/neutral judgment [sees]
AP8. Team explicit information processing time [sees]
AP9. Slack time (time remaining at final decision) [sees]
SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE
AP10. Error rate (according to TAO's prior subjective hostility ratings)
API 1. False alarm rate (according to TAO's prior subjective hostility ratings)
API 2. Miss rate (according to TAO's prior subjective hostility ratings)






AS 1 . Number of database queries by leader (to see subordinate's latest judgment)
DECISIONMAKING
AS2. Leader's initial judgment (1: neutral, 2: hostile)
AS3. Leader's initial confidence (1: low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
AS4. Leader's initial composite target hostility judgment [0-100%]
AS5. Number ofjudgment changes by leader over time (e.g.. 1 1£1 —> 2 changes)
AS6. Change in leader's confidence over time
II.3: Subordinates (IDS, TIC, EWS)
INFORMATION SEEKING
AS7. Total number of probes by subordinates (information seeking activity)
AS8. Information seeking rate: AS7 / AP8 [probes/«£?r
AS9. Information seeking unbalance among subordinates (std. dev. / mean)
INFORMATION RECORDING
AS 10. Total number of database entries by subordinates
INFORMATION PROCESSING
ASH. Final judgment by DM 1 (1: small, 2: mid-size, 3: large)
AS 12. Final judgment by DM2 (1: climbing, 2: leveling-off, 3: descending)
AS13. Final judgment by DM3 (1: no emission, 2: search , 3: fire control)
ASM. Final confidence ofDM 1 (1; low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
AS15. Final confidence ofDM2 (1; low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
AS 16. Final confidence ofDM3 (1; low, 2: moderate, 3: high)
AS 17. Final composite hostility judgment by DM1 [0-100%]
AS 1 8. Final composite hostility judgment by DM2 [0-100%]
AS 19. Final composite hostility judgment by DM3 [0-100%]





AC1. Total number of messages sent
riOl Hi Mi imiiii -— /A ^ 1 / AP8) * 60 [msgs/min]
COMMUNICATION-DIRECTION:
messages from leader to subordinates (down)
usages from subordinates to leader (up)
messages from subordinate to subordinate (horizontal)
ninication rate (AC3 / AP8) * 60 [msgs/min] -
AC7. Total number of broadcast messages sent by leader
COMMUNICATION-INFORMATION
AC8. Percentage of information transfers
AC9. Percentage of information requests
AC10. Percentage of non-informational communications (team bolstering, etc..)
COMMUNICATION-INFORMATION FLOW
AC1 1 . Total number of information requests by leader
AC12. Total number of information transfers by leader
AC 13. Total number of information transfers by subordinates to leader
ACM. Anticipation ratio (= (AC13 - AC1 1) / AC13) [0-100%]
COMMUNICATION-INFORMATION GRANULARITY AND DIRECTION
AC 15. Total number of processed information messages
AC 16. Number of processed information messages sent by leader
AC17. Number of processed information messages sent by subordinates
AC1 8. Total number of raw data messages
AC 19. Total number of raw data messages sent by leader





AW1. Normalized, calibrated SWAT score for DM1 [0 - 100%]
AW2. Normalized, calibrated SWAT score forDM2 [0 - 100%]
AW3. Normalized, calibrated SWAT score forDM3 [0 - 100%]
AW4. Normalized, calibrated SWAT score for leader [0 - 100%]
TEAM
AW5. Normalized, calibrated average SWAT score for subordinates [0 - 100%]
AW6. Normalized, calibrated SWAT score for team (group scale) [0 - 100%]
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